I would like to begin with the analysis of R. Safarov's answer to the question formulated in the following manner by journalists: "What is the reason of the interestedness in consolidation of their links with America on the part of Central Asian countries?" the author's answer if formulated fairly simply and includes to following elements:
a) Economy ties were broken with the disintegration of the USSR.
b) Due to certain hardships Russia was unable to render necessary political and economic support to the newly-born states.
c) In this connection they (Central Asian states, N. Fakhri's note) threw themselves into the arms of the West and obtained, as a rule, insignificant, but - in some cases - effective aid".
The author is likely to consider that 900 million American dollars allotted last year by the USA for the maintenance of the new states of Central Asia are not quite an adequate sum. However, it is worth mentioning that this sum can be correlated with the cost of Busher AES construction in Iran liked often to be spoken of by R. Safarov, as he regards this project to be strategically important for the Russian economics. Today one can state for sure that without active economic aid on the part of the West, and the USA first and foremost, the new states of Central Asia wouldn't have provided that relative social-political stability which was extremely necessary in the transitional period.
The author also asserts that: "… the present tendency of Central Asian states turning into the USA direction can't be permanent. Americans want to bribe them. On the other hand the countries in question strive to ensure their security at the cost of American presence. We may take Saudi Arabia as an example. One of the factors of security for the governors of this country is American presence". The course of the author's judgments is similar with the position of radical Russian communists who always accuse the USA of all things. The comparison of the situation when Central Asian countries like Saudi Arabia aspire to ensure their security at the cost of American presence, mildly speaking, doesn't in general yield to logical comprehension. For the moment of the USSR collapse Russia enjoyed military presence in all Central Asian countries, but for the present moment it lost the former completely except Tajikistan where Russian military and borderguard subdivisions are disposed both today. Western countries and the USA only utilize airdromes in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for effectuation of humanitarian peacemaking missions in Afghanistan and the international antiterroristic operation supported not only by Russia, but by all Central Asian states. Moreover, neither Western Europe nor the USA ever conducted the policy of double standards and supported any of Central Asian leaders in exchange for their stance in so far as the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were concerned. On the contrary, official criticism of separate aspects of development in these countries, and first of all, in the field of human rights, democratization of society and economic reforms has intensified. The only thing in which one can consent with Mr. R. Safarov is that Russia really strives to reinstate its positions and influence in the Central Asian region.
However, today it will depend not on the wish of Russia but on what the latter is really able to offer to these countries for their economy and mutually profitable cooperation in other spheres. Today, unfortunately, it is rather difficult to single out, at least, one domain where the cooperation of Russia and Central Asian states would respond to the increased requirements of the current moment.
In this aspect an interesting answer was given to the question: "… do they (Central Asian countries, N. Fakhri's note) consider it necessary to collaborate with one another?" Mr. R. Safarov writes: "Russia exercises efforts to build up a closer union with Central Asian states. For example, the steps are undertaken for a formation of financial and economic union" and further on: "I think in the course of the nearest two-three years a union between these states will be created whatever it may be like, and in the long run the influence of Russia in Central Asian countries will reinforce". I don't know what the author implied concretely, but it is absolutely obvious that, regretfully, Russia neither had nor has a clear-cut strategy in the Central Asian region. Probably, it accounts for Russia's aspirations to provide its interests only through local relations with each Central Asian state separately. Thus, with Turkmenistan these relations are concerned with natural gas, with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan they go within EurAsEC frameworks, with Kazakhstan - within the frames of the forming economic amalgamation of the four, with Uzbekistan these common points haven't been found yet, and the author's allegation in Russia being an alternativeless consumer of Uzbek cotton is simply not true to reality. Hereby Russia which didn't manage to become a real center of economic and political integration for Central Asian states was never concerned with supporting democracy and economic reforms in these countries considering these objectives not to be of a priority order.
The author's stance on the problems of Russian-Iranian cooperation in the nuclear realm causes especial interest. The leader of the contemporary Iran scrutiny Center deems that the principle problem lies in the USA and West endeavors not to admit Russia to the perspective market of Iran and he calls the leadership of Russia never to curtail the cooperation with Iran in the realm of nuclear power and to resist the pressure on the part of the West and the USA. Moreover, the author grants a potentiality of deploying a system of antiair defense on the part of Russia in order to ensure a protection of Busher AES being in the process of erection from future strikes of the USA in case Iran appeals with such a request. Mr. R. Safarov alleges that "Americans planned to inflict bombing upon Busher AES and nuclear objects in Natanz and Arake before their exploitation. But it wouldn't be called a war but pointed blows upon concrete Iranian targets. Such actions will deliver a tangible damage both upon Iran and Russia from the economic and political points of view". Evolving this theme the author analyses even scenarios of a potential military action versus Iran on the part of the USA. At last, Mr. Safarov makes a conclusion. "To my mind, if Iran moves such a proposal Russia must give a weighty, cogitated and reasonable answer. It would be fairly logical".
As for my vision of the events, I can suppose that if Russia takes a position expounded by the leader of the contemporary Iran scrutiny Center and activizes a cooperation with Iran in nuclear realm being lobbied by Minatom and diverse Iranian groups, in the offing it my find itself in a considerably more complicated political situation than it did during the war in Iraq.
Of course, one may admit that for Russia Iran is the only chance to be a purveyor of modern technologies for the markets of the third world countries and an economic constituent is naturally important. At the same time Russia traditionally strives to support special political relations with Iran as well (as it was done in reference to the regimes in Iraq and KPDR); probably, it looks upon this country as an element in building up a multipolar world whose ideas are roaming in the Kremlin as before. However, one should not forget that Iran is governed by the antidemocratic clerical regime, over 80% of economy are controlled by the state; a powerful opposition being shaped into the bargain both inside the country and abroad. I think the author will agree that there is enough information as to Iran supporting a number of terroristic organizations in the Near East, its exercising a destabilizing influence in Afghanistan and Iran. One call recall an utterly negative role of Iran in the events of the early 90-ies in Tajikistan. That's why the world community traces extremely attentively the development of Iranian nuclear program; the apprehensions concerned with AES construction as scenery for covering the jobs in making nuclear weapons are quite substantiated. These apprehensions reinforced after MM had published some particulars of the report composed by the International Agency on atomic energy confirming the facts of dressed uranium being revealed on the nuclear object in Natanz. Quoting the leader of the organization in question, Mr. Muhammad el-Baradey, the question of whether Iran is creating nuclear weapon is extremely important for security in the region. The USA stance on that issue, released by the representative of the State Department sounds as follows: "until Tehran meets all IAAE requirements and alleviates the agitation of the world public at large around the nuclear program not a single country must cooperate with Iran in the field of atomic energy, Russia inclusive". The European Community presented by its representative on the issue of outward policy and security Xavier Solana also called Iran to sign the complementary protocol to the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear arms.
I consider that under the conditions formed Russia and its leadership will try, first of all, to elaborate a common stance on Iranian problem coordinated with the West, the USA and IAAE. This step won't imply for it (Russia, N. Fakhri's note) a loss of billions of dollars already as it would forfeit the principal thing - that of trust on the part of the entire world". In distinction to Mr. R. Safarov I am convinced in the reversed: By undertaking this step Russia and its leadership will prove that the country is actually ready for close collaboration in the name of peace, democracy and universal development. All countries striving for progress and prosperity are interested in it.